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A QBist Ontology
U.J. Mohrhoff
Abstract Quantum mechanics accounts for the formal aspects of human sen-
sory experience in terms of spatial relations between the constituents of a
hierarchy of quantum objects and, ultimately, in terms of reflexive relations
entertained by a single relatum or Ultimate Object. Schro¨dinger explained
the fact that (despite “the absolute hermetic separation” of our respective
“spheres of consciousness”) we experience a common world by invoking an
Ultimate Subject and by appealing to the philosophy of the Upanishads, ac-
cording to which the Ultimate Subject is one with the Ultimate Object: the
world is a manifestation by the One (qua Ultimate Object) to the One (qua
Ultimate Subject) and hence to us, who (according to Schro¨dinger) are but
“various aspects of the One.” The paper builds on Kant’s theory of science,
Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics, QBism’s emphasis on the universal
context of science (i.e., human experience), and Brigitte Falkenburg’s detailed
analysis of the particle concept. The Upanishadic framework of thought ad-
vocated by Schro¨dinger, moreover, is well suited not only to making physical
sense of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics but also to ad-
dressing major problems in the philosophies of mind and life. How some of
these problems can be solved in this framework is outlined.
Keywords Bohr · Experience · Kant · Particles · QBism · Realism ·
Schro¨dinger · Upanishads
1 Introduction
The beginning of the 21st Century saw the launch of a radically epistemic inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics, by Carlton Caves, Chris Fuchs, and Ruediger
Schack [1]. Initially conceived as a generalized personalist Bayesian theory of
probability called “Quantum Bayesianism,” it has since been re-branded as
“QBism,” the term David Mermin [2] prefers, considering it “as big a break
with 20th century ways of thinking about science as Cubism was with 19th
century ways of thinking about art.” The big break lies not in the emphasis
that the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics is a probability calcu-
lus but in this plus a radically subjective Bayesian interpretation of probability
Ulrich Mohrhoff
Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education
605002 Pondicherry India
E-mail: ujm@auromail.net
ar
X
iv
:2
00
5.
14
58
4v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
25
 M
ay
 20
20
2 U.J. Mohrhoff
plus a radically subjective interpretation of the events to which, and on the
basis of which, probabilities are assigned by “users” (of quantum mechanics)
or “agents” (in a quantum world).1
I am indebted to QBism for two reasons. First: it made me look more
closely at the original writings of Niels Bohr and discover (i) that the vari-
ous “Copenhagen interpretations” are more or less grotesque caricatures of his
views, and (ii) that Bohr came tantalizingly close to adopting a QBist stance
[3,4]. The principal differences between his views and QBism are attributable
to the fact that Bohr wrote before interpreting quantum mechanics became a
growth industry, while QBism emerged in reaction to an ever-growing num-
ber of attempts at averting the “disaster of objectification” [5] caused by the
reification of (mostly) unitarily evolving quantum states. And second: QBism
made me come round to seeing that there is no difference between observations
qua experiences and observations qua measurement outcomes.
The present paper puts forward a view of the world that is indebted to
QBism. This means, inter alia, that it is not based on the reification of any of
the following items: quantum states or any other mathematical tools, symbols,
or relations, logical or grammatical relations, probabilities, the spatiotemporal
structure of human sensory experience, particles or fields, measuring instru-
ments or any other classical implements. It is about a reality in which quantum
mechanics plays a certain part, and about the part that quantum mechanics
plays in it.
Science does not take place in a conceptual vacuum. It functions within
a more or less acknowledged metaphysical framework that informs both the
questions scientists ask and their attempts at making sense of the answers they
receive. This framework is not testable by the methods of empirical science.
The present state of confusion concerning the physical significance of the math-
ematical formalism of quantum mechanics2 is a sure sign and consequence of
the cavalier attitude among contemporary physicists towards a conscientious
examination of their largely unavowed metaphysical presuppositions.
The first to rigorously examine the legitimacy of the concepts used in
formulating physical theories was Immanuel Kant [7,8], and the first to re-
examine the conceptual framework staked out by Kant in light of the new
field of experience opened up by the quantum theory was Niels Bohr. Ac-
cordingly the respective focal points of Secs. 2–5 are Kant’s theory of science,
Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics, and QBism’s emphatic return to the
universal context of science, human experience. Section 5 also explains why
1 While Fuchs and Schack prefer the term “agent,” Mermin prefers the term “user,” to
emphasize that QBists regard quantum mechanics as a “user’s manual” [2].
2 “Most physicists have no clear conception of the interpretation of their most basic theory,
quantum mechanics. They are largely unaware of the exact nature of the problems in giving
a detailed and consistent account of the physical meaning of the theory; and if they are
aware, they often don’t care very much. Only very small numbers of researchers have given
serious thought to the interpretational problems of quantum mechanics, and have expressed
more or less detailed points of view. As can perhaps be expected from the statistics of small
numbers, the diversity of opinion is large. Very different ideas have been put forward, none
of them supported by great numbers of physicists.”—Dennis Dieks [6]
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postulating a self-existent and intrinsically partitioned spacetime manifold is
a recipe for disaster.
Section 6 is concerned with the meaning and reference of the word “par-
ticle.” Central to the discussion (because most informed) is the “generalized
particle concept” proposed by Brigitte Falkenburg [9]. Kant’s theory of sci-
ence had made it possible (i) to ignore the subject’s part in organizing sense
impressions into a system of external objects, and (ii) to forget about the em-
pirically inaccessible origin of sense impressions, the thing-in-itself. Quantum
mechanics not only makes it all but impossible to ignore the part our subjec-
tive experiences play in constructing an external world but also requires us
to come to terms with the uncaused nature of clicks in counters and (more
generally) the absence of causally sufficient conditions for outcome-indicating
events. These events have this in common with the sensory material Kant had
dealt with that their causes are not to be found in the empirically accessible
world. As was stressed by Erwin Schro¨dinger in 1951 [10, pp. 131–32] and
by Ole Ulfbeck and Aage Bohr fifty years later [11], the individual detection
events that make up a particle track, while statistically correlated, are causally
disconnected. Falkenburg’s (admittedly “subjective”) assumption that there is
a unique, re-identifiable causal agent behind the detection events that make
up a specific track therefore seems unwarranted. What is warranted (in light
of “the loss of spatiotemporal individuality and the indistinguishability of all
quantum particles” acknowledged by her) is the association of a single causal
agent with every detection event, not only with those that form a specific track.
The Kantian thing-in-itself thus resurfaces as the sole cause of the events that
the quantum laws serve to correlate.
No physical theory can account for the existence of classically conceived
forms, just as no physical theory can account for the existence of sensory qual-
ities (qualia). Quantum mechanics, however, entails a re-conceptualization of
form, and this makes it possible to account for the existence of forms. The
formal aspects of human sensory experience are dynamically accounted for in
terms of spatial relations between (ultimately) formless relata. Because form-
less relata are indiscernible, we can invoke the Identity of Indiscernibles and
regard the spatial relations that make up the formal aspects of our experience,
not as relations between a multitude of relata, but as the self-relations of a
single relatum or a single substance. And since it is consistent to attribute the
ability to cause clicks to a single non-local agent corresponding to the Kantian
thing-in-itself, it is also consistent to identify that single non-local agent with
this single substance. This is the gist of Sec. 7.
If the spatial relations that make up the formal aspects of our external ex-
periences are reflexive relations entertained by a single substance or Ultimate
Object, then there is more to the agreement between our respective external
experiences than the ability to communicate them to each other. If the Ulti-
mate Object is the same for all of us, then the reflexive relations it entertains
are the same for all of us, in which case we all experience the same world, al-
beit from different vantage points. To Schro¨dinger, the agreement between our
respective external experiences, despite “the absolute hermetic separation” of
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our respective “spheres of consciousness,” was deeply problematic. His expla-
nation for why we all experience the same world was that we are all aspects of
a single Ultimate Subject. By attributing his explanation to the Upanishads,
he also suggested a synthesis of the two explanations, for according to these
ancient Sanskrit texts the Ultimate Object is one with the Ultimate Subject.
The world is a manifestation by the One (qua Ultimate Object) to the One
(qua Ultimate Subject) and hence to us, who (according to Schro¨dinger) are
but “various aspects of the One” [12]. This is the gist of Sec. 8.
The Upanishadic framework of thought advocated by Schro¨dinger is well
suited not only to making sense of quantum mechanics but also to addressing
major problems in the philosophies of mind and life. In the final section I
indicate how some of those problems can be solved in this framework.
2 Kant’s theory of science
The appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 marks the end of the
modern period and the beginning of something entirely new. . . . Like other
watershed figures, Kant has contributed to the shape of world civilization,
and the conceptualization we have of the world today.
— Martin Scho¨nfeld and Michael Thompson [13]
In an essay written during the last year of his life, Erwin Schro¨dinger [12]
expressed his astonishment at the fact that despite “the absolute hermetic
separation of my sphere of consciousness” from everyone else’s, there is “a
far-reaching structural similarity between certain parts of our experiences,
the parts which we call external; it can be expressed in the brief statement
that we all live in the same world.” This similarity, Schro¨dinger avowed, “is
not rationally comprehensible. In order to grasp it we are reduced to two
irrational, mystical hypotheses,” one of which was “the so-called hypothesis
of the real external world.” According to this hypothesis, there is “a real
world of bodies which are the causes of sense-impressions and produce roughly
the same impression on everybody.” Schro¨dinger left no room for uncertainty
about what he thought of it: to invoke the existence of such a world “is not to
give an explanation at all; it is simply to state the matter in different words.
In fact, it means laying a completely useless burden on the understanding”—
the burden of invoking a relation of which we are profoundly ignorant. While
we can use language to compare those parts of our experiences that we call
external, we have no way of comparing this hypothetical world of bodies with
those parts of our experiences about which we agree.
Schro¨dinger’s skepticism about the aforesaid hypothesis is as old as skepti-
cism itself. Some twenty-five centuries ago, the Greek philosopher-poet Xeno-
phanes pointed out that even if our minds represented the world exactly as
it was, we could never know that this was the case: “for if he succeeds to the
full in saying what is completely true, he himself is, nevertheless, unaware of
it” [14]. In the 18th Century, David Hume argued that “[t]he mind has never
A QBist Ontology 5
anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any ex-
perience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion
is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning” [15]. For George Berkeley,
the problem was that we lack a suitable concept of likeness: “an idea can be
like nothing but an idea” [16]. (In the 17th Century, it had become customary
to refer to perceptions as “ideas.”)
In his wonderfully polemical book Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Immanuel Kant,
who was a major philosophical source for Schro¨dinger [17], argued not only
against the superstitious beliefs of his time but also against a belief that has
remained widespread up to the present day: the belief “that my thinking Ego
is in a place which differs from the places of other parts of that body which
belongs to me” [18]. Kant adds: “No experience teaches me . . . to shut up my
Ego into a microscopically small place in my brain from whence it may move
the levers of my body-machine.”
Kant went on to publish one of the most influential philosophical works
of all time. Before Kant, there appears to have been no philosopher who did
not think of the relation of our perceptions to the (real or imaginary) external
world as a relation of similarity. To 17th-Century thinkers like Rene´ Descartes
and John Locke, it seemed to pose no difficulty to conceive of perceived sizes
and shapes as similar to real sizes and shapes. That a perceived color should be
similar to an unperceived color in the external word was a more questionable
proposition. Locke and Descartes therefore distinguished between “primary
qualities,” which were independent of the perceiving subject, and “secondary
qualities,” which bore no similarities to sensations but had the power to pro-
duce sensations in the perceiving subject. Eventually, though, thinking of per-
ceived sizes and shapes as similar to real sizes and shapes proved to be no less
questionable than the proposition that color sensations are similar to colors in
the external world. Berkeley made it clear that to ask whether a table is the
same size and shape as my mental image of it was to ask an absurd question.
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant started out by saying that all qualities
are secondary. Nothing of what we say about an object describes the object
as it is in itself, independently of how it affects us. But Kant did not stop
at saying that if I see a desk, there is a thing-in-itself that has the power to
appear as a desk, and if I see a chair in front of the desk, there is another
thing-in-itself that has the power to appear as a chair. For Kant, there was
only one thing-in-itself, a transcendent reality that has the power to affect us
in such a way that we have the sensations that we do, and that we are able to
“work up the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects”
[7, p. 136]. Observe the dramatic change in the meaning of “object”—from
being something unperceived that has the power to affect us to being the
product of a mental synthesis of impressions.
Today the idea that the object of knowledge is created (or at least shaped)
by the knowing mind is taken for granted by most continental philosophers.
The term “continental philosophy” was adopted by professional philosophers
in England after World War II to describe the various schools and movements
then prominent in continental Europe, and to distinguish them from a set of
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loosely related approaches, commonly known as “analytic philosophy,” which
had been prevalent from the early twentieth century in England and later
in the United States and other English-speaking countries. The philosopher
primarily responsible for initiating the analytic/continental divide was Kant.
The central thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason is that space and time are
only subjective forms of human intuition. “Intuition” is the standard trans-
lation of the German word Anschauung, which covers both visual perception
and visual imagination. The revolutionary position taken by Kant was that
the experienced world, or the world of appearances, was constructed by the
human mind from a combination of sensory material that is passively received
and concepts that owe their meanings not to particular experiences but to the
context in which empirical knowledge is gained, the human mind.
Assuming the absence of limits to the spatiotemporal resolution of human
sensory experience, and taking for granted the apparent possibility of orga-
nizing the raw material of sensible impressions into a system of objects from
which the organizing subject can withdraw, Kant was able to demonstrate
the existence of regulative principles which, in relation to the resulting system
of objects, take the form of universal laws. The concepts needed to formu-
late these laws owe their meanings to the logical or grammatical structure of
human thought or language and to the spatiotemporal structure of human
sensory experience.
One of these concepts is substance. To Aristotle, a property was whatever
could be the predicate of a logical or grammatical subject, while a substance
was something that could not be predicated of anything else. Substances, there-
fore, enjoyed independent existence, while properties could only exist as at-
tributes of substances. From Aristotle to Descartes, to be meant either to be
a substance or to be a property of a substance. With Descartes, the human
conscious subject assumed the role of a substance: to be came to mean either
to be a subject or to exist as a representation for a subject. “I think, therefore
I am,” and because I am real, my perceptions are real. In the words of the
good Bishop Berkeley, “to be is to perceive or be perceived.”
John Locke distinguished between two conceptions of substance, (i) a “no-
tion of pure substance in general” and (ii) “ideas of particular sorts of sub-
stance” [19]. The first notion is “nothing but the supposed, but unknown,
support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist
sine re substante, without something to support them.” In other words, it is
something that the qualities we find existing do not need—“any more than
the earth needs an elephant to rest upon,” as Bertrand Russell [20] later put
it. Substances in sense (ii) are “such combinations of simple ideas as are, by
experience and observation of men’s senses, taken notice of to exist together.”
They are connected to a substance (or bundled by it) the way predicates are
connected to (or bundled by) a logical or grammatical subject. They are some-
times referred to as “Lockean (empirical) substances.”
In Kant’s theory of empirical knowledge, substance provides a regulative
principle that does two jobs: it bundles appearances the way a logical or gram-
matical subject bundles predicates, and it makes it possible for me to think of
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my perceptions as connected not in or by me but in or by an external object.
It makes it possible for me to forget that this object does, in fact, owe its
existence largely to me, the subject of my thoughts and experiences.
Another regulative principle combining two jobs is causality. It allows me to
think of appearances occurring at different times as connected in the manner
of another logical relation—that between antecedent and consequent (if. . .
then. . . ). And it makes it possible for me to think of my successive perceptions
as connected not primarily in my experience but objectively, as causes and
effects in an external world.3
But if I am to be able to think of my perceptions as a self-existent system
of external objects, the connections must be lawful. If appearances are to be
perceptions of a particular kind of object (say, an elephant), they must be
connected in an orderly way, according to a concept denoting a lawful con-
currence of appearances. And if appearances are to be perceptions of causally
connected events, like (say) lightning and thunder, they must fall under a
causal law, according to which one appearance necessitates the subsequent oc-
currence of another. Empirical science thus is concerned with causal laws and
natural kinds.
What truly exists for Kant are (i) sense impressions, (ii) a multiplicity of
individual subjects constructing an empirical knowledge of what thereby be-
comes an objective world, and (iii) an empirically inaccessible thing-in-itself
that (a) gives rise to sense impressions (in such a way that our minds are
able to organize them into a self-contained system of objects) and (b) makes
room for metaphysical speculation about such things as freedom and moral
responsibility. The first in a succession of German idealist philosophers who
aimed to get rid of the thing-in-itself [21] was Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Fichte
argued that experience, as an activity of consciousness directed towards ob-
jects, can be derived either from objects or from consciousness. Materialism
regards consciousness as a product of things; idealism sees things as products
of consciousness. To Fichte, either mode of explanation was consistent in itself,
but the attempt to explain experience by dependence on both was doomed to
failure. Fichte chose to attribute the existence of sense impressions to the free
act of self-determination of what he termed the Ego.
In the system of Fichte, the inter-subjective validity of empirical knowledge
was warranted by the coherence with which the supra-individual Ego produces
the private worlds of individual egos. This coherence creates the impression of
a single world shared by all. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling went farther
by maintaining that all egos actually inhabit a single world—a world made of
sensations and held together by the categories of a universal intelligence. While
in Kant’s system the categories were ways of thinking that made possible the
organization of sense impressions into a knowledge of objects, for Schelling
they were the girders of an ideal world.
3 Kant thought that another regulative principle was needed to objectivize the temporal
relation of simultaneity. In a relativistic world, in which simultaneity cannot be objectivized,
no such principle is needed.
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The most imposing system of idealism was that of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel, from whom many Continental philosophers of the 20th Century directly
or indirectly drew inspiration.4 Hegel’s philosophy stands as the culmination
of the metaphysical tradition that was inaugurated by the Eleatic philosopher
Parmenides, who resolved that only what is rational can be real. For Hegel, too,
there could be no epistemic chasm between the knowable and the unknowable,
for there was nothing that human reason could not adjudicate. In other words,
what human reason could not adjudicate was unreal and therefore unworthy
of consideration. One such “at bottom sensuous conception” was evolution.5
For Hegel, nature was as static as logic itself. The extravagant creativity of
natural production was the “impotency of nature,” her powerlessness to keep
within the bounds of reason.6
When quantum theory came along, what appeared to be a weakness of
Kant’s philosophy became one of its strengths. The weakness perceived by
Kant’s idealistic successors was that without conceiving of an empirically in-
accessible thing-in-itself as the cause of appearances, one could not enter the
Kantian system, and with it one could not remain in it, since within the Kan-
tian system causality was intelligible only as a regulative principle legislating
connections between appearances.
At first quantum mechanics seemed to require a radical departure from
the “classical universe of discourse” staked out by Kant. According to Brigitte
Falkenburg [9, pp. 28–29],
quantum mechanics is neither compatible with the traditional concept
of substance (that is, the principle of attributing properties to property
carriers) nor with the principle of causality in its usual application to
individual systems and processes. These traditional principles belong
to the classical universe of discourse, but they are at odds with the
structure of quantum phenomena.
Without a proper understanding of the term “quantum phenomenon,” as in-
troduced by Bohr and intended here by Falkenburg, this statement is likely to
be misread. Here is how a “(quantum) phenomenon” was defined by Bohr [25,
p. 312]:
[A]ll unambiguous interpretation of the quantum mechanical formal-
ism involves the fixation of the external conditions, defining the initial
state of the atomic system concerned and the character of the possible
predictions as regards subsequent observable properties of that system.
4 Including Ivan Alexandrovich Ilyin [22], from whom Vladimir Putin draws inspiration
[23].
5 “It has been an inept conception of earlier and later ‘Naturphilosophie’ to regard the
progression and transition of one natural form and sphere into a higher as an outwardly
actual production. . . . Thinking consideration must deny itself such nebulous, at bottom
sensuous, conceptions, as is in especial the so-called origin, for example, of plants and animals
from water, and then the origin of the more highly developed animal organizations from the
lower.” [24]
6 Putin, citing Ilyin, attributes to it the decadence of the West [23].
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Any measurement in quantum theory can in fact only refer either to a
fixation of the initial state or to the test of such predictions, and it is
first the combination of measurements of both kinds which constitutes
a well-defined phenomenon.
Bohr’s point of departure was the same as Kant’s, to wit: subjective phenom-
ena or appearances or experience. Both, therefore, were intent on establishing
the objective truth or validity of a scientific theory—Newtonian physics in
Kant’s case and quantum physics in Bohr’s. To Bohr, objectivity required
that the external conditions (defining the preparation of a system as well as
the possible outcomes of a subsequent measurement) “can be unambiguously
communicated in the common human language” [26, pp. 157–58]:
[In order that the] answers we can receive by so to say putting questions
to nature in the form of experiments . . . may contribute to objective
knowledge, independent of subjective judgement, it is an obvious de-
mand that the experimental arrangement as well as the recording of
observations be expressed in the common language, developed for our
orientation in the surroundings. [26, p. 212]
To communicate “what we have done and what we have learned” [25, pp. 273,
331, 349, 390, 418], we rely on a common language, and this involves the tra-
ditional concepts of substance and causality. To Kant, the ability to attribute
properties to substances, and to connect them according to the principle of
causality, were preconditions of the possibility of empirical knowledge, and to
Bohr this they remained : “the objective character of the description in atomic
physics depends on the detailed specification of the experimental conditions
under which evidence is gained” [26, p. 215], and the detailed specification
of these conditions involves the description of the apparatus as a property-
carrying substance conforming to causal laws.
What changed when quantum mechanics came along, therefore, was not
that the classical universe of discourse was no longer adequate but that it was
no longer closed. It as it were acquired windows into another “universe” or
“domain,” and these windows—quantum phenomena—afford us a glimpse of
the thing-in-itself. As I shall argue in the following sections, quantum me-
chanics all but compels us to conceive of two kinds of causality, one belonging
to the classical universe of discourse, which concerns a world that is directly
accessible to human sensory experience, and one that links this world to its
origin, the thing-in-itself (or something like that).
3 From Kant to Bohr
As a philosopher Niels Bohr was either one of the great visionary figures
of all time, or merely the only person courageous enough to confront head
on, whether or not successfully, the most imponderable mystery we have
yet unearthed. — N. David Mermin [27]
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Today, interpreting quantum mechanics is widely understood to mean grafting
a metaphysical narrative onto the theory’s mathematical apparatus, and to do
so in a language that is sufficiently vague philosophically to be understood by
all and sundry. To Bohr, on the other hand, it meant finding an epistemolog-
ical framework which could take the place of the epistemological framework
originally staked out by Kant.
The crucial premise of Kant’s inquiry was that “space and time are only
forms of sensible intuition, and therefore only conditions of the existence of
the things as appearances” [7, p. 115]. Therefore “we have no concepts of the
understanding and hence no elements for the cognition of things except insofar
as an intuition can be given corresponding to these concepts.” And therefore
“we can have cognition of no object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it
is an object of sensible intuition, i.e. as an appearance.” Bohr could not have
agreed more, insisting just as Kant did that meaningful physical concepts have
visualizable content: there is something we can imagine, be it the image of a
particle following a trajectory or the image of a wave propagating in space. But
Bohr also realized that “the facts which are revealed to us by the quantum
theory . . . lie outside the domain of our ordinary forms of perception” [28,
p. 217], by which he meant space and time.
Kant did not anticipate the possibility of an empirical knowledge that,
while being obtained by means of sense impressions organized into objects, was
not a knowledge of sense impressions organized into objects. Bohr realized that
quantum mechanics was that kind of knowledge. What Bohr added to Kant’s
theory of science was his insight that empirical knowledge was not necessarily
limited to what is directly accessible to our senses, and that, therefore, it
did not have to be solely a knowledge of sense impressions organized into
objects. It can also be a knowledge of properties which (i) are defined by
experimental arrangements (which are directly accessible to our senses), and
which (ii) actually exist (or are actually possessed) only if their presence is
indicated by the results of actual experiments. The click in a counter does not
simply indicate the presence of something inside the region monitored by the
counter. The counter defines a region, and the click constitutes the presence
of something within it. Without the click nothing is there, and without the
counter there is no there.
As long as the only relevant context was human experience (as it was for
Kant), or as long as the reach of human sensory experience was potentially
unlimited (as it was for Newton and classical physics in general), the elision of
the subject could be achieved: one could think and behave as if the objective
world existed—more or less as it was perceived or conceived—independently
of perceiving and conceiving subjects. Having asserted that “we can have cog-
nition of no object as a thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of
sensible intuition, i.e. as an appearance,” Kant could go on to affirm that
even if we cannot cognize these same objects as things in themselves,
we at least must be able to think them as things in themselves. For
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otherwise there would follow the absurd proposition that there is an
appearance without anything that appears. [7, p. 115]
But now there was more than one relevant context. In classical physics, a sin-
gle picture could accommodate all of the properties a system can have at any
moment of time. When quantum mechanics came along, that all-encompassing
picture fell apart. Unless certain experimental conditions obtained, it was im-
possible to picture the electron as following a trajectory (which was never-
theless a routine presupposition in setting up Stern–Gerlach experiments and
in interpreting cloud-chamber photographs), and there was no way in which
to apply the concept of position. And unless certain other, incompatible, ex-
perimental conditions obtained, it was impossible to picture the electron as a
traveling wave (which was nevertheless a routine presupposition in interpret-
ing the scattering of electrons by crystals), and there was no way in which to
apply the concept of momentum.
For the present-day physicist it is not easy to understand the bewilderment
that the founders and their contemporaries experienced in the early days of the
quantum theory. Previously, the objectivity of science hinged on the possibility
of thinking of appearances as properties of substances. One could think and
behave as if the properties of the perceived world owed their existence to
substances, rather then to the subjects by which they were perceived. But now
at least some properties—including those of atoms and subatomic particles—
appeared to owe their existence not to substances but to the experimental
conditions under which they were observed. The position indicated by a droplet
belonging to a track in a cloud chamber was the position of a particle because
it was indicated by the droplet. The momentum indicated by two neighboring
droplets belonging to a track was the momentum of a particle because it was
indicated by the droplets. As Heisenberg [29] phrased it, “Die ‘Bahn’ entsteht
erst dadurch, da wir sie beobachten”—a particle’s path only comes into being
because we observe it.
But if atoms and subatomic particles owe their properties not to indepen-
dently existing substances but to the experimental conditions under which
they are observed, the experimental apparatus cannot owe its existence to the
quantum-physical systems of which it is commonly said to be composed. And
in that case neither can any of the objects that are likewise directly accessible
to human sensory experience. Hence if for Bohr the description of atomic phe-
nomena had “a perfectly objective character,” it could only be “in the sense
that no explicit reference is made to any individual observer and that there-
fore . . . no ambiguity is involved in the communication of information” [26,
p. 128, emphasis added]. It could no longer be in the sense that no reference
was made to (the community of) observers.
4 From Bohr to QBism
By the time quantum mechanics came along, scientists and philosophers alike
had realized that renouncing ontological ambitions and sticking to opera-
12 U.J. Mohrhoff
tionally definable notions was the safest way to arrive at reliable knowledge. If
I jiggle the electrons in this antenna, then in due course the electrons in that
antenna will jiggle as a result. Given the details of how I jiggle the electrons
here, the fundamental equations of classical electrodynamics allow me to pre-
dict how the electrons will jiggle there. Classical electrodynamics thus serves
as a predictive tool. It makes it possible to calculate the observable effects of
observed causes.
But classical electrodynamics could also be seen as describing a physical
process by which causes produce effects. It made it possible to transmogrify
a calculational tool—the electromagnetic field—into something as real as the
electrons and their motions.7 What made it possible to reconcile the conceptual
economy of operationalism with a seemingly unabashed metaphysical realism
was Kant’s theory of science. The latter was therefore widely considered to be
tightly linked with classical physics. When classical physics failed to account
for such things as the radiation spectrum of a glowing hot object or the stability
of atoms, Kant’s philosophy seemed to have gone out the window as well.
Bohr took it upon himself to restore the objectivity of physical science as
far as that remained feasible. Like Kant, he took for his starting point the
universal context of empirical science, which is human experience. Kant had
demonstrated the respective roles substance and causality play in the con-
struction of a world of objects from which the constructing subject can, for
all practical purposes, withdraw. The possibility of this withdrawal, however,
was conditioned on the absence of the very contextuality that was revealed
by quantum mechanics: the dependence of the properties of atoms and sub-
atomic particles on the experimental apparatus by which they were defined,
and by which their presence was indicated. How, in that case, does one secure
objectivity? One secures it by re-defining it as intersubjective agreement. But
for this one needs a language that everybody can understand:
By objectivity we understand a description by means of a language
common to all. [26, p. xxxvii]
From a logical standpoint, we can by an objective description only
understand a communication of experience to others by means of a
language which does not admit ambiguity as regards the perception of
such communications. [26, p. 276]
Faced with the question of how under such circumstances we can achieve
an objective description, it is decisive to realize that however far the
phenomena transcend the range of ordinary experience, the description
of the experimental arrangement and the recording of observations must
be based on common language. [26, p. 158]
7 The resulting story is (too) well known. On being jiggled, the electrons in this antenna
locally act on the electromagnetic field. On being jiggled by the electrons, the field then
acts locally on itself. (Imagine a bucket brigade with infinitely many buckets separated by
infinitesimal distances.) In this way the jiggles of the field propagate as an electromagnetic
wave, and when this reaches the electrons in that antenna, it causes them to jiggle as well.
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It is worth pointing out that Bohr did not once in the thirteen volumes of his
Collected Works [30] refer to (let alone require the use of) “classical language”
or “the language of classical physics.” When he referred to classical concepts,
he meant concepts we can all understand. Classical concepts were classical not
because they are proprietary to classical physics but because their meanings
are rooted in what we have in common, to wit: the spatiotemporal structure of
human sensory experience and the logical or grammatical structure of human
thought or language.
The fundamental difference between Bohr and QBism can be attributed
to the fact that between Bohr’s time and the advent of QBism, renewed (and
increasingly desperate) attempts were made to transmogrify a calculational
tool into a subject-independent physical process—this time without sanction
of Kant’s theory of science and therefore with disastrous results.8 The seed was
sown when von Neumann [31] and Dirac [32] interpreted the wave function’s
dependence on the time of a measurement (to the possible outcomes of which
it serves to assign probabilities) as the time dependence of an evolving state
of some kind. To Bohr, by contrast, the quantum-mechanical formalism repre-
sented “a purely symbolic scheme permitting only predictions . . . as to results
obtainable under conditions specified by means of classical concepts” [25, pp.
350–51]. In other words, “the physical content of quantum mechanics [was]
exhausted by its power to formulate statistical laws governing observations
obtained under conditions specified in plain language” [26, p. 159].
Once the wave function’s dependence on time was construed as the time
dependence an evolving state of some kind, physicists were saddled with two
modes of evolution, only one of which could be “normal” and thus not in need
of explanation. This is why QBists feel compelled to address a problem that
to Bohr was so obviously spurious that he never felt the need to address it,
to wit: the problem of explaining why measurements have (or seem to have)
outcomes, or how measurements are (or seem to be) possible at all.
The great merit of QBism, as Mermin phrased it, is to “put the scientist
back into science” [33]. It is past time to recall the origin of the objective
world in human experience, which in Bohr’s time and the cultural environ-
ment in which he lived was still widely taken for granted. If measurements are
irreversible and outcomes definite, it is for no other reason than that experi-
ences are irreversible and definite [3]. This is why quantum mechanics cannot
be anything but a compendium of correlations between experiences, which is
the position QBists are now fiercely defending. To drive home the ultimate
context of empirical science, QBists emphasize the individual subject. At first
8 It is not my intention to cast doubt on the significant progress that has been made
between Bohr’s time and the advent of QBism. We now have a congeries of complex, so-
phisticated, and astonishingly accurate probability algorithms collectively known as “the
standard model,” and we are witnessing rapid growth in the exciting fields of quantum in-
formation and quantum technology. Yet it is a fact that the contemporaneous progress in
quantum theory’s philosophical foundations mainly consists in finding out what does not
work.
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experience is not ours; it is yours and mine. It becomes ours, and the process
by which it becomes ours is communication:
What is real for an agent rests entirely on what that agent experiences,
and different agents have different experiences. An agent-dependent re-
ality is constrained by the fact that different agents can communicate
their experience to each other, limited only by the extent that personal
experience can be expressed in ordinary language. Bob’s verbal repre-
sentation of his own experience can enter Alice’s, and vice-versa. In this
way a common body of reality can be constructed. [34]
What is this if not a concise formulation (or if you prefer, explication) of one
of the salient points of Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics?
5 The meaning of “definite”
Fuchs [35] once asked: “If the quantum state represents subjective information,
then how much of its mathematical support structure might be of that same
character?” In order to perform calculations—be it of scattering amplitudes or
of quantum states—we make use of Cartesian coordinates. If scattering ampli-
tudes and quantum states are tools we use to calculate (inherently subjective)
probabilities, how can the coordinates on which these tools functionally de-
pend not represent subjective information? Whether we use projector-valued
measures to represent the sensitive regions of an ideal array of detectors, or
POVMs to represent the unsharply bounded sensitive regions of a more real-
istic array of detectors, we make use of a system of spatial coordinates. The
question thus arises whether this coordinate system defines the regions moni-
tored by the detectors or is defined by them.
Here is what happens—at any rate, in the relativistic theory—if one begins
by postulating an independently existing spacetime manifold. As Hegerfeldt
[36,37] and Malament [38] have shown, a free particle, localized at a time t1 in
a bounded region R1, has a non-zero probability to be found at a time t2 > t1
in a bounded region R2, even if in the time between t1 and t2 no light signal
can travel from R1 to R2. Since this is inconsistent with the theory of relativity,
it appears to follow that particles cannot be localized. Having shown that this
result also obtains for unsharply localized particles, Clifton and Halvorson [39]
concluded that particle talk is “strictly fictional”:
The argument for localizable particles appears to be very simple: Our
experience shows us that objects (particles) occupy finite regions of
space. But the reply to this argument is just as simple: These experi-
ences are illusory! Although no object is strictly localized in a bounded
region of space, an object can be well-enough localized to give the ap-
pearance to us (finite observers) that it is strictly localized.
What Hegerfeldt, Malament, and Clifton and Halvorson have actually shown
is that particles are not localizable relative to an independently existing space-
time manifold M. This conclusion, however, is irrelevant, for such a manifold
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is not the expanse in which position measurements are made. Positions, being
contextual, owe their existence to detectors, and what holds for “objects (par-
ticles)” holds as well for objects (detectors). If particles cannot be localized in
finite spatial regions of M, then neither can detectors and the spatial regions
defined by them. What is strictly fictional, therefore, is the existence of an
independently existing and intrinsically partitioned spatiotemporal manifold.
Such a manifold is a useful, even indispensable tool for calculating scattering
amplitudes, but as the basis for an ontological quantum reality, it is a recipe
for disaster.
I used to argue (i) that the sharpest coordinate background that can be
objectivized9 is defined by the positions of macroscopic objects, which there-
fore are unsharp only in relation to an imaginary coordinate background that
can not be objectivized, and (ii) that as a result the positions of macroscopic
pointers can be consistently treated as definite per se, and thus as capable
of pointing [40,41,42,43,44]. Thanks to QBism I have come to realize that
we are always dealing with quantum phenomena (i.e., with context-dependent
situations or tasks), and that coordinates enter into each of the corresponding
calculations separately and independently of the others. Hence there is no need
(nor any justification) for conjuring up a single “one-size-fits-all” coordinate
background. The only reason why a pointer can point (i.e., indicate something
to someone) is that it is present in, or accessible to, direct sensory experience.
Assuming that every thing was accessible to direct sensory experience,
Kant concluded that
every thing, as to its possibility, stands under the principle of thorough-
going determination, according to which, among all possible predicates
of things, insofar as they are compared with their opposites, one must
apply to it. [7, p. 553]
Kant’s principle of thoroughgoing determination continues to hold for every-
thing that is accessible to direct sensory experience. It applies to “the fixation
of the external conditions, defining the initial state of the atomic system con-
cerned,” and it applies to “the character of the possible predictions as regards
subsequent observable properties of that system.” It applies to “the experi-
mental arrangement” as well as to “the recording of observations.” It applies
to every outcome-indicating property and (by implication) every indicated
outcome.
There also can be no question about the “shifty split” deplored by Bell [45].
Nothing could be clearer than the location of the split (a.k.a. the Heisenberg
9 I use the noun “objectivation” and the verb “to objectivize” when the intended meaning
is the representation of a mental construct as something external to our minds. Objectivation
allows us to think and behave as if such a construct existed independently of the construct-
ing mind. I use the noun “objectification” and the verb “to objectify” when the intended
meaning is the miraculous appearance of a measurement outcome (as in “the disaster of
objectification”).
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cut)—of which there is one per experiment10 and per experiencing subject. As
Mermin [46] explains,
Each split is between an object (the world) and a subject (an agent’s ir-
reducible awareness of her or his own experience). Setting aside dreams
or hallucinations, I, as agent, have no trouble making such a distinc-
tion, and I assume that you don’t either. Vagueness and ambiguity only
arise if one fails to acknowledge that the splits reside not in the objective
world, but at the boundaries between that world and the experiences
of the various agents who use quantum mechanics.
Vagueness and ambiguity arise if we “reify the common external world we
have all negotiated with each other, purging from the story any reference to
the origins of our common world in the private experiences we try to share with
each other through language” [2]. (The result of this purge and this reification
goes by the name of “instrumentalism.”)
6 Of particles and clicks
In the early days of the quantum theory, the impossibility of accurately predict-
ing a particle’s momentum following a measurement of its position was often
explained by saying that a measurement “disturbs” the particle in some un-
controllable manner. It was also common to say that the properties of quantum
systems are brought into being by measurements. Bohr repeatedly cautioned
against such phrasings, e.g.:
The unaccustomed features of the situation with which we are con-
fronted in quantum theory necessitate the greatest caution as regards
all questions of terminology. Speaking, as is often done, of disturbing
a phenomenon by observation, or even of creating physical attributes
to objects by measuring processes, is, in fact, liable to be confusing,
since all such sentences imply a departure from basic conventions of
language which, even though it sometimes may be practical for the
sake of brevity, can never be unambiguous. [25, p. 316]
If there is nothing to be disturbed, if even the dichotomy of objects and at-
tributes created for them by measuring processes is ambiguous, then maybe
it is not just the measured property but the object itself that is constituted
by the experimental conditions under which it is observed. In the beginning
10 To Bohr, the split lay between the quantum system and “the whole experimental ar-
rangement, the specification of which is imperative for any well-defined application of the
quantum-mechanical formalism” [47, original emphasis]. If the diaphragm is fixed, it is
treated as accessible to direct sensory experience and therefore as part of the experimental
arrangement. If the diagram is moveable, it is part of the system under investigation and
therefore not accessible to direct sensory experience. To give a more recent example, the
experimental context can be such that the molecular geometry of C60 is revealed, and it can
be such that the wavelike behavior of C60 molecules is displayed [48]. For a discussion of
Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s divergent views on this matter see Camilleri and Schlosshauer [49].
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of the 21st Century, this suggestion was followed up by Ulfbeck and (Aage)
Bohr [11]. Like Kant and subsequently (Niels) Bohr, Ulfbeck and Bohr view
space and time as “a scene established for the ordering of experiences.” Clicks
in counters belong to this scene. Particles traveling from counter to counter
and producing clicks do not. While clicks are “events in spacetime, belonging
to the world of experience,” there are no particles “on the spacetime scene.”
Genuinely fortuitous clicks, occurring by themselves, form “the basic material
that quantum mechanics deals with.”
To this basic material, quantum mechanics adds lawful statistical correla-
tions, and these make it possible to classify clicks as electron clicks and neutron
clicks etc. It does, however, take more that one click to identity a click as an
electron click or a neutron click. There has to be a sequence of clicks, it must
be possible to interpret each click as constituting the presence of the same kind
of object, and it must be possible to interpret each click as constituting the
presence of the same individual object. Particle detectors are designed so that
these conditions are satisfied. The number of potential counters in a detector is
enormous compared to the number of clicks elicited during each experimental
run. This (along with the conservation of energy-momentum) makes it possible
to observe tracks, each indicating not only the presence of the same individual
particle at the locations indicated by the clicks (or droplets, or whatever else
makes up a track) but also the type to which the particle (and hence each
click) belongs.11 In short, it is not only the path of a particle that comes into
being because we observe it; it is the particle itself. The same point was made
by Falkenburg in her monograph Particle Metaphysics [9]:
only the experimental context (and our ways of conceiving of it in clas-
sical terms) makes it possible to talk in a sloppy way of quantum ob-
jects. . . . Bare quantum “objects” are just bundles of properties which
underlie superselection rules and which exhibit non-local, acausal cor-
relations. . . . They seem to be Lockean empirical substances, that is,
collections of empirical properties which constantly go together. How-
ever, they are only individuated by the experimental apparatus in which
they are measured or the concrete quantum phenomenon to which they
belong. . . . They can only be individuated as context-dependent quan-
tum phenomena. Without a given experimental context, the reference
of quantum concepts goes astray. In this point, Bohr is absolutely right
up to the present day. [9, pp. 205–6, original emphases]
Quantum concepts have three features: axiomatic, operational, and referen-
tial. The axiomatic (chiefly group theoretical) particle concept only refers to
particle types. The operational particle concept is based on the probabilistic
11 A sequence of clicks makes it possible to determine such quantities as its radius of
curvature (in a magnetic field), the particle’s time of flight, its kinetic energy, and/or its
energy loss through ionization and excitation. Measuring three of these quantities is sufficient
in principle to positively identify the particle type [50]. (The type of a neutral particle,
which cannot be inferred directly from a track, can be inferred indirectly from the particle’s
interactions with charged particles, with the help of conservation laws.)
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(i.e., ensemble) interpretation, whereas the individual events which make up
an ensemble are subject to measurement laws with classical foundations (i.e.,
correspondence principles).
Hence, the axiomatic and the operational meaning of quantum con-
cepts fall apart as far as these concepts refer to individual events and
systems. . . . At the level of individual systems, the operational concepts
are not quantum concepts, whereas the axiomatic concepts do not refer.
[9, pp. 202–4]
The attribution of physical properties to subatomic particles is not
based on one unified theory but on several incommensurable theories.
The current concepts of subatomic particles have axiomatic aspects
which stem from quantum field theory, operational aspects which rest
on classical measurement laws, and referential aspects which are un-
clear. . . . The gap between [the group theoretical particle concept] and
the operational particle concept is only closed by belief, by a trust in
the unity of physics that remains unjustified in view of the unresolved
quantum measurement problem. [9, p. 324, original emphasis]
Should it come as a surprise that the referential aspects are unclear? If one
insists on turning a tool for calculating probabilities (depending on the time of
a measurement) into a dynamical process, then one has no choice but to model
a measurement as a two-stage process—a “premeasurement” (pm) taking the
prepared state of a quantum system (S) and the neutral state of an apparatus
(A) to a bi-orthogonal entangled state of the combined system S+A, and the
subsequent coming into existence of an outcome called “objectification” (ob):
|A0〉|ψ〉 (pm)−→
∑
k
ck|Ak〉|qk〉 (ob)−→ |A(q)〉|q〉. (1)
And then one is faced with a spurious problem and insolubility theorems re-
garding the same [51,52].12 It should take but a glance to notice that |A0〉
and |A(q)〉 are indicating states of the apparatus, the former indicating its
being in the neutral state, the latter indicating an outcome. Some relation to
an experiencing subject is thereby implied, and this reduces to nonsense the
notion of a “premeasurement” leading to a superposition of apparatus states.
There is no such thing as a superposition of outcome-indicating states. There
is only one way to make sense of (1), and this is to interpret the transition from
the initial to the final state as an indivisible quantum phenomenon. Without
getting rid of the spurious intermediate state, one has no choice but to get
rid of the final state, in which case “the theory disproves its own interpreta-
tion, making statements that are hard to believe: after the measurement, the
macroscopic pointer of the apparatus does not possess an objective value of
the pointer observable” [51, p. 107].
12 More advanced discussions using non-orthogonal overcomplete bases of Gaussian wave
packets in place of orthogonal apparatus states run up against exactly the same spurious
problem [53, pp. 323–28].
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To integrate the incommensurable particle aspects with as little metaphys-
ical padding as possible, Falkenburg proposes a “generalized particle concept,”
where particles
are still conceived [as they are operationally, i.e.] as Lockean empiri-
cal substances or bundles of properties. This concept is metaphysically
modest, but not abstinent. Even a liberalized particle concept must be
metaphysical. It is based on the realistic belief that there is an entity
which appears as a stable bundle of properties in the phenomena. . . .
Obviously, this is a weakened version of the traditional metaphysics of
substance. Due to the loss of spatiotemporal individuality and the in-
distinguishability of all quantum particles, the metaphysical carriers of
the properties are cancelled, but some metaphysical glue is left which
makes them stick together. . . . [T]he underlying idea is that there is
a something which is localized by a position measurement. This idea
is supported by the conservation laws, above all energy conservation.
Operationally, the particle behind a track is nothing but the repeated
localization of conserved dynamic quantities. This is a lot since we can-
not but interpret the repeatability as indicating an underlying entity.
But it is not too much. [9, pp. 259–60, original emphases]
Falkenburg [9, pp. 335–36] suggests that particles, operationally conceived,
“have to be understood in the sense of Kant’s concept of substance, that is,
as stable, reidentifiable bundles of properties.” There is, however, a significant
difference between the basic material of particle physics (genuinely fortuitous
clicks and lawful statistical correlations between clicks) and the sensory ma-
terial that Kant had been dealing with. Kant had argued that since it was
possible to organize sense impressions into a self-contained system of objects,
there had to be re-identifiable bundles of properties, and these bundles (in or-
der to be re-identifiable) had to be governed by causal laws. Quantum objects,
on the other hand, are neither bundles of sensible properties nor governed by
causal laws.
Kant’s theory of science had made it possible (i) to ignore the subject’s
part in organizing sense impressions into a system of external objects, and
(ii) to forget about the empirically inaccessible origin of sense impressions, the
thing-in-itself.13 Quantum mechanics not only makes it all but impossible to
ignore the part our subjective experiences play in constructing the external
world but also requires us to come to terms with the uncaused nature of clicks
in counters and (more generally) the absence of causally sufficient conditions
for outcome-indicating events.14 To “naturalize” these events, Falkenburg goes
beyond the mere assertion that “[t]he cause of a particle track is not an isolated
13 If this forgetfulness then leads us to seek the cause of our sense impressions within the
world we have constructed from our sense impressions, we are in trouble [54,55].
14 A measurement is fortuitous not only with regard to its particular outcome but also
with regard to its occurrence. There are no causally sufficient conditions for the success of
an attempted measurement. The redundancy built into a typical apparatus can maximize
the (empirical) likelihood of success, but it cannot guarantee success.
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causal agent but a non-local quantum process” [9, p. 335]. Her generalized
particle concept, as we just saw, includes the “realistic belief that there is an
entity which appears as a stable [and re-identifiable] bundle of properties in
the phenomena.” It includes both “[t]he (subjective) assumption that there is
a unique causal agent behind repeated particle detections” and the assumption
that this causal agent provides “the (only) metaphysical glue that makes the
collection of properties stick together” [9, p. 336].
Nobody seems to have rejected this “naturalization” of quantum theory’s
uncaused events more forcefully than Schro¨dinger, who (in a slim volume first
published in 1951) wrote:
When you observe a particle of a certain type, say an electron, now
and here, this is to be regarded in principle as an isolated event. Even
if you do observe a similar particle a very short time later at a spot
very near to the first, and even if you have every reason to assume a
causal connection between the first and the second observation, there
is no true, unambiguous meaning in the assertion that it is the same
particle you have observed in the two cases. . . . It is beyond doubt that
the question of “sameness,” of identity, really and truly has no meaning.
[10, pp. 121–22, original emphases]
We must not admit the possibility of continuous observation. Observa-
tions are to be regarded as discrete, disconnected events. Between them
there are gaps which we cannot fill in. . . . [I]t is better to regard a parti-
cle not as a permanent entity but as an instantaneous event. Sometimes
these events form chains that give the illusion of permanent beings—
but only in particular circumstances and only for an extremely short
period of time in every single case. [10, pp. 131–32, original emphasis]
To be fair, Falkenburg stresses that physical reality is relational in that (i) it is
context dependent,15 (ii) it is defined relative to classical concepts, and (iii) it
is energy dependent such that (e.g.) the quark-antiquark and gluon content
of nucleons increases with increasing scattering energies [9, p. 334]. And she
adds:
The relational account of subatomic reality defended here results from
a top–down approach. The opposite bottom–up explanation of the clas-
sical macroscopic world in terms of electrons, light quanta, quarks, and
some other particles remains an empty promise. Any attempt at con-
structing a particle or field ontology gives rise to a non-relational ac-
count of a subatomic reality made up of independent substances and
causal agents. But any known approach of this type is either at odds
15 “The context dependence of quantum phenomena expresses two insights of Bohrs com-
plementarity philosophy. First, the appearance of complementary quantum phenomena such
as particle tracks and interference patterns depends on the experimental arrangement. Sec-
ond, all quantum phenomena occur in a macroscopic experimental device or environment.
There are no quantum objects in their own right that may be isolated from the measurement
device.” [9, p. 334].
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with the principles of relativistic quantum theory or with the assump-
tion that quantum measurements give rise to actual events in a classical
world. [9, p. 339, original emphases]
All the same, Falkenburg’s (admittedly subjective) assumption that there is
a unique, re-identifiable causal agent behind the detection events that make
up a specific particle track seems unwarranted. What is warranted (in light
of “the loss of spatiotemporal individuality and the indistinguishability of all
quantum particles” acknowledged by her) is the association of a single causal
agent with every detection event, not only with those that form a specific
track. While each click (and more generally each successful measurement) is
fortuitous in the sense of lacking a cause in the sensible world, it is safe to say
that all clicks are caused by a single agent in much the same sense in which
all impressions are caused by Kant’s thing-in-itself.
7 The shapes of things (are the shapes of only one thing)
For Kant, what remained of the empirically inaccessible world-in-itself was an
unspeakable thing-in-itself that has the power to affect us in such a way that
we have the sensations that we do, and that we (or our minds) are able to
organize our sensations into objects that interact with each other and change
in a lawful manner. How our sensations come to be arranged in ways that allow
us to organize them into a self-contained system of objects, he could not say.
Enter quantum mechanics. To be sure, quantum mechanics does not explain
how sensations come to be arranged as they are, and this not only because no
physical theory can account for the existence of sensations but also because
no physical theory can account for the existence of classically conceived forms.
Quantum mechanics entails a re-conceptualization of form, and this puts it in
a position to account for the existence of forms.
Everything in sensory experience not only is localized—it is there—but also
is spatially extended and therefore conceptually divisible by cutting. The literal
meaning of the Greek word α-τoµoς is “un-cuttable.” The reason it is usually
translated as “indivisible” is that, until quantum mechanics came along, the
parts of a material object were thought to be defined by boundaries acting in
the manner of three-dimensional cookie cutters, while their forms were thought
to be defined by boundaries separating their “stuff-filled” insides from their
vacant outsides. Plato believed that the Universe could be described using
five simple shapes—the solids named after him, four of which he believed to
constitute the four elements Fire, Air, Water, and Earth—but he obviously
could not account for the origin of these original shapes. The Greek atomists
held that atoms came in an infinite variety of sizes and shapes, which likewise
remained unaccounted for. Newton [56] speculated “that God in the Beginning
form’d matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles, of such
Sizes and Figures, and with such other Properties, and in such Proportion
to Space, as most conduced to the end for which he form’d them”—and he
(Newton) left it at that.
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The first to give a dynamic explanation of extension and impenetrabil-
ity was Roger Boscovich (Bosˇkovic´). On the basis of his study of collisions,
Boscovich arrived at an atomic theory in which matter was reduced to a dy-
namic system of relations between identical dimensionless “points of force”
lacking mass and substantiality. His Theory of Natural Philosophy published
in 1758 was well known and influential for 150 years. His work inspired Fara-
day’s lines of force, it advocated a relational view of space, and it accounted
for the stability of objects in terms of equilibria between attractions and re-
pulsions.16 So impressed was Friedrich Nietzsche by Boscovich’s elimination
of matter that he compared him to Copernicus.17
While Boscovich arguably achieved the complete elimination of pre-existent
forms, classical point mechanics, for which he laid the foundation, retained
them in the shape of point masses. Quantum mechanics is the first theory
to provide a successful and complete dynamical reduction of form. If a quan-
tum object has a form, it consists of indefinite spatial relations between its
components. If it lacks components, it also lacks a form.18 What I mean by
saying that a physical quantity Q is indefinite is that it can be described by a
function that assigns probabilities to the (counterfactually possible) outcomes
of an unperformed measurement of Q.
Like Kant, Bohr insisted that the concepts at our disposal (without which
we could not understand each other) derive their meanings from the spatiotem-
poral structure of human sensory experience and the logical structure of human
thought or the grammatical structure of human language. Among the concepts
that owe their meanings primarily to our “forms of perception” are position
and orientation as well as the conserved quantities whose existence is implied
(via Noether’s theorem) by the symmetries of space and time. (Even the con-
served charges, which are defined in terms of generalized rotations in some
abstract space, are intelligible because we can visualize rotations.) But Bohr
also insisted that “the facts which are revealed to us by the quantum theory
. . . lie outside the domain of our ordinary forms of perception” [28, p. 217].
If this stands to reason, as I believe it does, we can describe these facts nei-
16 Here is how Henry Cavendish summarized the essentials of Boscovich’s theory [57, p. 51]:
“[M]atter does not consist of solid impenetrable particles as commonly supposed, but only of
certain degrees of attraction and repulsion directed towards central points. They also suppose
the action of two of these central points on each other alternately varies from repulsion to
attraction numerous times as the distance increases. There is the utmost reason to think
that both these phenomena are true, and they serve to account for many phenomena of
nature which would otherwise be inexplicable.”
17 “While Copernicus convinced us to believe, contrary to all our senses, that the earth
does not stand still, Boscovich taught us to renounce belief in the last bit of earth that did
‘stand still,’ the belief in ‘matter,’ in the ‘material,’ in the residual piece of earth and clump
of an atom: it was the greatest triumph over the senses that the world had ever known.”
[58, p. 14]
18 According to the current standard model of particle physics, some quantum objects,
including electrons and quarks, are fundamental in the sense of not being composed of other
quantum objects. While such objects are often described as pointlike, this can only mean
that they lack internal structure, which is another way of saying that they lack component
parts [43, Sec. 9].
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ther as they are in themselves nor by directly applying to them the concepts
at our disposal. The only way in which we can describe them is in terms of
lawful statistical correlations between the possible outcomes of unperformed
measurements.
Quantum mechanics, I maintain, is not primarily a tool for assigning prob-
abilities to the possible outcomes of measurements on the basis of actual mea-
surement outcomes. In the first place, it is a tool for describing the indefinite
aspects of quantum objects in the only way such aspects can be described,
i.e., by means of statistical correlations between the definite aspects of imag-
inary outcome-indicating devices. We are reduced to imagining such devices
because there are no nondestructive measurements of the position of, say, an
electron within the atom.19 Hence in order to extend the reach of the concepts
at our disposal beyond the domain of our ordinary forms of perception, we
cannot but resort to imagining them, and we implicitly do so. Bell’s objection
to the pivotal role that measurements play in quantum mechanics is therefore
misdirected. The theory is not “exclusively about piddling laboratory opera-
tions” [45]. Actual laboratory operations mainly serve the purpose of testing
in empirically accessible contexts the theory’s probabilistic description of the
indefinite aspects of quantum objects.
The indefinite aspects of quantum objects that are of particular interest
here, are their forms. The form of a bipartite object—for instance, that of a
hydrogen atom if the structure of its nucleus is ignored—consists of a single
indefinite relative position. The time-independent forms of such an object are
determined by the outcomes of three measurements: of the object’s energy,
its total angular momentum, and one component of its angular momentum.
The form of a quantum object with N components “exists” in a configuration
space of 3 × N dimensions and consists of N × (N−1)/2 indefinite relative
positions. The abstract forms of nucleons (bound states of quarks), nuclei
(bound states of nucleons), atoms (bound states of nuclei and electrons), and
molecules (bound states of atoms) “exist” in probability spaces of increasingly
higher dimensions. At the molecular level of complexity, however, a different
kind of form comes into being: a 3-dimensional form that can be visualized,
not as a distribution over a 3-dimensional probability space, but as it is. I am
referring to the spatial arrangement of the atoms constituting a molecule.20 If
“classicality” emerges, it is at the molecular level of complexity. If there is a
quantum-classical boundary, it is molecules that straddle it. There is something
19 Only at the level of whole atoms has it been possible to localize individual parts of
matter at the surface of crystals, by means of an electron microscope. What is observed
here is the quasi-classical charge distribution to which a quantum mechanical many-particle
system gives rise in a macroscopic environment. [9, p. 249]
20 What contributes to making these configurations visualizable is that the indefiniteness
of the distance d between any pair of bonded atoms, as measured by the standard deviation
of the corresponding probability distribution, is significantly smaller in general than the
mean value of d.
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on the classical side, namely their atomic configurations, which change slowly,
while the electron wave functions follow adiabatically.21
So the formal aspects of our experience are dynamically accounted for in
terms of spatial relations between the constituents of a hierarchy of quantum
objects, and ultimately between formless quantum objects. Why the emphasis
on spatial relations (i.e., relative positions and relative orientations)? For one
thing, because the essential difference between classical objects (i.e., objects
directly accessible to sensory experience) and quantum objects is that the
former are localized while the later are contextually localizable (i.e., capable of
being localized relative to a classical context).22 And for another because, as
Arthur Eddington and later Henry Margenau [60] remarked, all measurements
are ultimately position measurements, resulting as they do from readings of
pointer positions.23
But if the formal aspects of human sensory experience are dynamically
accounted for in terms of spatial relations between (ultimately) formless relata,
we can invoke the principle of the identity of indiscernibles and regard the
spatial relations that make up the formal aspects of our external experiences
not as relations between a multitude of relata but as the self-relations of a
single relatum or a single metaphysical substance. (It stands to reason that
formless relata are indiscernible; more on this below.) And if it is consistent to
attribute the ability to cause clicks to a single non-local agent corresponding
to the Kantian thing-in-itself, then it is also consistent to identify this single
non-local agent with that single metaphysical substance.
It is not a new idea that particles of the same type are numerically identical,
in the sense of being multiple aspects of the same thing. In his Nobel Lecture
Feynman recalled: “I received a telephone call one day at the graduate college
at Princeton from Professor Wheeler, in which he said, ‘Feynman, I know
why all electrons have the same charge and the same mass.’ ‘Why?’ ‘Because,
they are all the same electron!’ ” Nor is it a new idea that the particle types
that exist are determined by (and thus are primarily features of) the dynamical
21 Only molecules consisting of very few atoms are known to occur in energy and angular
momentum eigenstates [59, p. 99].
22 As the reader will recall from Sec. 5, the Cartesian coordinate systems used by quantum
mechanics are defined by the experimental context, and are therefore trivially context-
dependent. Regarding localizability, Falkenburg [9, p. 261–62, original emphasis] qualifies:
“today localizability is no longer considered to be a necessary particle criterion. In the
case of the quarks the sum rules of the dynamic properties and momentum, the pointlike
scattering behavior in a certain energy domain, and the causal stories associated with jet
events are considered to be sufficient.”
23 Likewise Feynman and Hibbs [61]: “all measurements of quantum-mechanical systems
could be made to reduce eventually to position and time measurements (e.g., the position
of a needle on a meter or the time of flight of a particle). Because of this possibility a theory
formulated in terms of position measurements is complete enough in principle to describe all
phenomena. Nevertheless, it is convenient to try to answer directly a question involving, say,
a measurement of momentum without insisting that the ultimate recording of the equipment
must be a position measurement and without having to analyze in detail that part of the
apparatus which converts momentum to a recorded position.” Margenau qualifies: “there
is at least one important kind of measurement that cannot be reduced to pointer readings,
namely, counting.”
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laws. As we have seen, one cannot identify the type to which a particle belongs
by looking at a single click. In scattering experiments, particles are identified
by their tracks and by the laws that govern the correlations between clicks. It
therefore makes more sense to think of the type to which a particle belongs as
intrinsic to these laws than as intrinsic to the particle.24 Also relevant here is
the fact that particles are individuated only “by the experimental apparatus
in which they are measured or the concrete quantum phenomenon to which
they belong” [9, p. 206].
That all particles, even those belonging to different types, can be regarded
as numerically identical, may also be justified as follows. Consider an elastic
scattering event with a pair incoming particles “in” states |1〉 and |2〉 and a
pair of outgoing particles “in” states |A〉 and |B〉.25 If the two particles are
of the same type, we could say (if we endorsed the eigenvalue–eigenstate link)
that initially there are two things with respective properties 1 and 2, and that
subsequently there are two things with respective properties A and B, but we
cannot say that there are two enduring things. And if there are no enduring
things, one readily agrees with Schro¨dinger that there are no things [17]. At
best one could say that there is one thing initially observed to have properties
1 and 2 (e.g., being here as well as being there) and subsequently observed to
have properties A and B (e.g., moving this way as well as moving that way).
What does change if the two particles are of different types? Suppose that
the initial states are |α, 1〉 and |β, 2〉, and that the final states are |α,A〉 and
|β,B〉. What seems justified, given the above, is that initially there are two
things each with two properties (α, 1 and β, 2), and that subsequently there
are again two things each with two properties (α,A and β,B). But to say
that now there are two enduring things, one carrying property α and one
carrying property β, appears to be as unwarranted as saying that the droplets
constituting the path of a particle are caused by an enduring entity. What
remains warranted is that there is one thing, which is initially observed in
possession of the property pairs (α, 1) and (β, 2), and which is subsequently
observed in possession of the property pairs (α,A) and (β,B). The rest is
classical embroidery.
8 Schro¨dinger’s take
I used to attribute the necessary distinction between a non-contextual classical
domain and a contextual quantum domain to the difference between the man-
24 It has been argued, moreover, that every quantum theory involving several particle
species can be transformed into a theory of just one species, without any change in the
testable predictions [62]. Von Weizsa¨cker [63] appears to have suggested this possibility half
a century ago when he wrote: “Finally, we hope to reduce the species of elementary particles
to a single basic lawful order, which perhaps we ought not to describe as the existence of a
single basic species but rather as the law that specifies all of them.”
25 For brevity’s sake the conventional “in” is used in lieu of the correct mouthful. Needless
to say that a particle cannot be “in” a probability algorithm. Nor is a conditional assignment
of probability 1 (conditioned on there being an outcome) sufficient for “is” or “has.”
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ifested world and its manifestation [43,44]. I conceived of the manifestation
of the world as a progressive transition from the undifferentiated unity of a
single metaphysical substance to a multitude of distinguishable objects with
definite properties, via formless particles, non-visualizable atoms, and partly
visualizable molecules. I therefore thought of subatomic particles, atoms, and
molecules not as constituent parts of the world but as instrumental in its man-
ifestation. In this conceptual framework there arises the question as to how the
intermediate stages of the transition are to be described, and the answer that
appeared obvious to me (and still does) is that whatever is not intrinsically
definite can only be described in terms of probability distributions over what is
intrinsically definite, to wit: the possible outcomes of measurements. What is
instrumental in the manifestation of the world can only be described in terms
of correlations between events that happen (or could happen) in the manifested
world. This, I argued (and still do), is why the general theoretical framework
of contemporary physics is a probability calculus, and why the events to which
it serves to assign probabilities are measurement outcomes. What I did not at
first realize and later sufficiently stress was that the manifested world contains
objects and properties that are intrinsically definite only because it is an expe-
rienced world. The only properties that can be regarded as definite per se are
the properties of classical objects, which (being directly accessible to sensory
experience) are subject to Kant’s principle of thoroughgoing determination.26
But now another question calls for attention. To QBists as well as to Bohr,
objectivity is based on communication in ordinary language, as we saw in
Sec. 4. This was also Schro¨dinger’s take [12], albeit with a somewhat wider
concept of “language.” Having pointed out that “each person’s sense-world
is strictly private and not directly accessible to anyone else,” he asked: “how
do we come to know of this general agreement between two private worlds,
when they admittedly are private and always remain so?” What establishes
the correspondence “between the content of any one sphere of consciousness
and any other, so far as the external world is concerned”? His answer:
What does establish it is language, including everything in the way of
expression, gesture, taking hold of another person, pointing with one’s
finger and so forth, though none of this breaks through that inexorable,
absolute division between spheres of consciousness.
But if the spatial relations that make up the formal aspects of our experience
(yours as well as mine) are spatial relations between numerically identical
relata—if, in other words, they are reflexive spatial relations entertained by
a single metaphysical substance or thing-in-itself—then there is more to the
agreement “between the content of any one sphere of consciousness and any
26 This incontrovertible fact cannot be grasped by those who aim to fit the world into a
self-existent and intrinsically partitioned spatiotemporal manifold. As has been pointed out
in Sec. 5, the coordinate systems used by quantum mechanics are anchored to the particular
set of classical objects that make up the experimental context. It is also worth a reminder
that the only individual quantum objects are those that are individuated by an experimental
context.
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other” than is warranted by language. It is true that the manifested world is
an experienced world. The world is not simply manifested; it is manifested to
us. But if the manifestation of the world (to us) begins (conceptually if not
temporally) with a single metaphysical substance entering into reflexive spatial
relations, then it stands to reason that this single metaphysical substance is
identically the same for all of us, and that the manifested world is the same for
all of us in a stronger sense than is warranted by our ability to communicate.
If my sense impressions did not agree with yours, it would be impossi-
ble for my description of my impressions to agree with your description of
yours. What remains unexplained by language is why my impressions agree
with yours to such an extent that we are able to compare our respective de-
scriptions. One way to explain this is to argue (as I just did) that the formal
aspects of our respective impressions resolve themselves into reflexive spatial
relations entertained by an Ultimate Object. Schro¨dinger proposed an alter-
native explanation, which involves an Ultimate Subject. To him, as mentioned
at the beginning of Sec. 2, the agreement between the content of my sphere
of consciousness with the content of yours was not rationally comprehensible.
“In order to grasp it,” he wrote, “we are reduced to two irrational, mystical
hypotheses.” We have seen what he thought of “the so-called hypothesis of
the real external world.” The other hypothesis, which he endorsed, was that
“we are all really only various aspects of the One” [12]. The multiplicity of
minds, he wrote in another work [64], “is only apparent, in truth there is only
one mind. This is the doctrine of the Upanishads. And not only of the Up-
anishads.” The Upanishads are ancient Sanskrit texts, which contain many of
the central concepts and ideas of classical Indian philosophy.
The “One” that Schro¨dinger had in mind is the Ultimate Subject, from
which we are separated by a veil of self-oblivion. By pointing to the Upan-
ishads, Schro¨dinger hints at the synthesis of the aforementioned alternative
explanations (his and mine), for the same veil, according to the Upanishads,
also prevents us from perceiving the Ultimate Object and its identity with
the Ultimate Subject. It prevents us from perceiving that the world is some-
thing that the One (qua Ultimate Object) manifests to itself (qua Ultimate
Subject)—and therefore to us who are but “various aspects of the One”.27
If at bottom we are all the same subject—without being aware of it, except
by a genuinely mystical experience that is hard to come by—then we have to
conceive of two poises of consciousness or modes of awareness, one in which
the One manifests the world to itself aperspectivally, as if experienced from
no particular location or from everywhere at once, and one in which the One
manifests the world to itself perspectivally, as if experienced by a multitude of
27 If “to Western thought this doctrine has little appeal,” Schro¨dinger [54] remarks, it is
because our science “is based on objectivation, whereby it has cut itself off from an adequate
understanding of the Subject of Cognizance, of the mind.” To which he adds that “this is
precisely the point where our present way of thinking does need to be amended, perhaps
by a bit of blood-transfusion from Eastern thought. That will not be easy, we must beware
of blunders—blood-transfusion always needs great precaution to prevent clotting. We do
not wish to lose the logical precision that our scientific thought has reached, and that is
unparalleled anywhere at any epoch.”
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subjects from a multitude of locations within the world.28 This means that our
impressions agree (to the extent they do) because we do, in fact, experience the
same world. But it also means the agreement between our respective impres-
sions is not explained by some relation of our respective consciousnesses to an
independently existing object (“the real world”). It is explained by the iden-
tity of our individual (“private”) consciousnesses with a single (as yet mostly
subliminal) subject.
9 Final thoughts
The Upanishadic framework of thought advocated by Schro¨dinger is well suited
not only to making sense of quantum mechanics but also to addressing major
problems in the philosophies of mind and life. While this cannot be demon-
strated here in any adequate detail, it seems appropriate to indicate how some
of these problems can be solved in this framework.
In the view of the Upanishads, all knowledge, all experience is founded on
identity. What ultimately exists, independently of anything else, is indistin-
guishably (i) a consciousness that contains, (ii) a substance that constitutes,
and (iii) an infinite Quality, Value, and Delight (a¯nanda) that experiences and
expresses itself in form and movement. It is easy to understand why the One
would adopt a multitude of standpoints within the world that it manifests to
itself: a mutual creative self-experience surely offers a greater variety of delight
than a solitary one. If the One adopts a multitude of localized standpoints,
knowledge by identity takes the form of direct knowledge: each individual
knows the others directly, without mediating representations. It is less easily
understood why the One would identify itself with any particular form to the
exclusion of all other forms, as it appears to do in us. But if this is what it
does, then it is again easy to see that knowledge of other forms will be reduced
to an indirect knowledge, i.e., a direct knowledge by the individual of some
of its own attributes (think electrochemical pulses in brains) which serve as
representations of external forms. Hence the question arises of how a direct
knowledge of internal representations becomes a knowledge of external forms.
This is (one aspect of) the problem of intentionality, which looms as large in
the philosophy of mind as the problem of qualia.
Neuroscience has figured out a great deal about the processes by which
the brain extracts information from images falling on our retinas [68,69,70].
This information is encoded in patterns of electrochemical pulses, and these
28 An aperspectival consciousness features prominently in the works of Jean Gebser [65,66]
and of Sri Aurobindo [67]. Such a consciousness transcends the distantiating viewpoint of
our perspectival outlook. There, the subject is where its objects are; it knows them by iden-
tity, by being them. The familiar dimensions of phenomenal space (viewer-centered depth
and lateral extent) come into being in a secondary poise, in which the One views the world
in perspective. There, objects are seen from “outside,” as presenting their surfaces. Concur-
rently, the dichotomy between subject and object becomes a reality, for a subject identified
with an individual form cannot be overtly identical with the substance that constitutes all
forms.
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Fig. 1 Indirect knowledge is the meeting point of information flowing inward from the
external object and information flowing outward from a subliminal self.
patterns need to be interpreted in order to be experienced as (or give rise to
experiences of) a world extended in space and time. The decoding or inter-
pretation of these firing patters presupposes acquaintance with the expanse
of space and the passing of time, and such acquaintance is not something
that neural processes can provide.29 So the question is not only “Whence the
sensory qualities?” but also “Whence our forms of perception?” The answer,
in Upanishadic terms, is that the incomplete information provided by neural
firing patterns is supplemented by a subliminal direct knowledge. Whatever
is missing from the internal representations—intentionality, qualia, including
our forms of perception—is supplied by a subliminal direct awareness, which is
founded on the Ultimate Subject’s identity with the Ultimate Object (Fig. 1).
Our indirect knowledge would not be possible if it were not supported by a
subliminal direct knowledge, even as direct knowledge would not be possible
if it were not founded on identity.30
29 Like the color of a Burmese ruby, spatial extension is a quality that can only be defined
by ostentation—by drawing attention to something of which we are directly aware. If you
are not convinced, try to explain to my friend Andy, who lives in a spaceless world, what
space is like. Andy is good at math, so he understands you perfectly if you tell him that
space is like a set of all triplets of real numbers. But if you believe that this gives him a
sense of the expanse we call space, you are deluding yourself. We can imagine triplets of real
numbers as points embedded in space; he cannot. We can interpret the difference between
two numbers as the distance between two points; he cannot. At any rate, he cannot associate
with the word “distance” the phenomenal remoteness it conveys to us. And much the same
goes for time. Time passes, and the only way to know this is to be aware of it.
30 In the words of Sri Aurobindo [67, pp. 560–61], who is arguably the most qualified mod-
ern interpreter of Upanishadic thought: “In the surface consciousness knowledge represents
itself as a truth seen from outside, thrown on us from the object, or as a response to its
touch on the sense, a perceptive reproduction of its objective actuality. . . . Since it is unable
to . . . observe the process of the knowledge coming from within, it has no choice but to
accept what it does see, the external object, as the cause of its knowledge. . . . In fact, it is a
hidden deeper response to the contact, a response coming from within that throws up from
there an inner knowledge of the object, the object being itself part of our larger self.”
30 U.J. Mohrhoff
I suppose we can all appreciate the advantage of a theory of existence that
has at its core an infinite Quality/Delight, over a framework of thought ac-
cording to which what is ultimately real is a multitude of entities (fundamental
particles or spacetime points) that lack intrinsic quality or value. In many tra-
ditions such a multiplicity is fittingly referred to as “dust.” But why should
the One not only adopt a multitude of standpoints but also identify itself with
each to the apparent exclusion of the others? And also: why should the rep-
resentations meditating the resulting indirect knowledge require something of
the order of a hundred billion neurons?
The main plot of the particular manifestation of the One in which we
(as aspects of the One) participate, is evolution. From the point of view of
the Upanishads, evolution presupposes involution. Involution begins with the
individual subject losing sight of its identity with the other subjects and, as
a result, losing access to the aperspectival view of things. But it does not
end there. Consciousness can become implicit in its aspect of formative force,
formative force can become implicit in inanimate forms, and the principle of
form can become implicit in a multitude of formless entities. And since formless
entities are indistinguishable and therefore (by the principle of the identity of
indiscernibles) numerically identical, involution ends with the One effectively
deprived of its innate consciousness and self-determining force. The Ultimate
Subject becomes implicit in the Ultimate Object. This (or something much
like it) is how the stage for the adventure of evolution was set.
What can justify such an adventure, considering all the pain and suffering
that (in hindsight) it entails? Certainly not an extra-cosmic Creator imposing
these evils on his creatures. But the One of the Upanishads is no such monster;
it imposes these things on itself. But still—why? Here goes:
a play of self-concealing and self-finding is one of the most strenuous
joys that conscious being can give to itself, a play of extreme attrac-
tiveness. There is no greater pleasure for man himself than a victory
which is in its very principle a conquest over difficulties, a victory in
knowledge, a victory in power, a victory in creation over the impossi-
bilities of creation. . . . There is an attraction in ignorance itself because
it provides us with the joy of discovery, the surprise of new and unfore-
seen creation. . . . If delight of existence be the secret of creation, this
too is one delight of existence; it can be regarded as the reason or at
least one reason of this apparently paradoxical and contrary Lila. [67,
pp. 426–27]
L¯ıla¯ is a term of Indian philosophy which describes the manifested world as
the field for a joyful sporting game made possible by self-imposed limitations.
If the force at work in the world is an infinite force working under self-imposed
constraints, as it is on the view presently outlined, then what we need to under-
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stand is not how it works,31 but why it works under the particular constraints
that it does.32
Also: will it always work under the particular constraints which form the
subject matter of physics? After all, a force working under self-imposed con-
straints is capable of lifting its constraints. Their purpose was to set the stage
for the drama of evolution; it was not to direct the drama. Evolution does
not happen without modifications—both momentary and semi-permanent—
of these constraints.33 Why, then, do we lack evidence of such modifications?
Because of the Houdiniesque nature of this manifestation. “If delight of ex-
istence be the secret of creation”—if, that is, the joys of winning victories,
overcoming difficulties, making discoveries, being surprised are possible ex-
pressions of this delight—then there have to be serious limitations, initially
and for a long time, on the range of possible modifications. Given the means
at our disposal, it will therefore be virtually impossible to discern where and
when such modifications occur.
The first aim of the force behind evolution is to bring into play the prin-
ciples of life and mind. Because it has to accomplish this through tightly
constrained modifications of the initial laws, the evolution of life necessitates
the creation of increasingly complex organisms, and the evolution of mind
necessitates the creation of increasingly complex nervous systems. Hence the
hundred billion neurons.
What about the future? Here is one aspect of Sri Aurobindo’s vision of
the same which, as bold as it is, is but an aspect of the logical de´nouement of
the Upanishadic view of existence: “to establish an infinite freedom in a world
which presents itself as a group of mechanical necessities . . . is offered to us
as . . . the goal of Nature in her terrestrial evolution” [67, p. 4]. Needless to
say, there is but one way in which infinite freedom can be attained, and that
is by becoming the sole determinant of the goings-on in the world. We are in
possession of true freedom to the extent that we are not only consciously but
also dynamically identified with the One. Absent this identification, our sense
31 While quantum mechanics tells us how the probabilities of the possible outcomes of mea-
surements are correlated, it offers no clue to the mechanism or process by which measurement
outcomes determine the probabilities of measurement outcomes. In fact, such explanations
appear to be ruled out by a growing number of no-go theorems [71,72,73,74,75]. If the force
at work in the world is an infinite force, this should be no cause for concern, inasmuch as any
attempt to explain the working of such a force in terms of physical mechanisms or natural
processes would be self-contradictory.
32 Arguably, a world about which anything coherent can be said requires, at a minimum,
sufficiently stable re-identifiable forms. If these are to be manifested through spatial rela-
tions between relata that lack spatial extent, the spatial relations (relative positions and
orientations) as well as the corresponding relative momenta must be indefinite, uncertainty
relations must hold, the relata must be fermions. . . , in short, something very much like
quantum mechanics must hold [41]. And if the manifested world is, in addition, to contain
individuals capable of telling causal stories about sufficiently stable re-identifiable objects,
something very much like the standard model and general relativity must hold [76,77].
(According to Wilczek [78], “[s]tandard model is a grotesquely modest name for one of
humankind’s greatest achievements.”)
33 This is not an argument for intelligent design. While a designer relies on the validity of
physical laws, the driving force behind evolution works by modifying them.
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of being the proud owner of a libertarian free will is, not indeed a complete
illusion, but the misappropriation of a power which belongs to our sublimi-
nal self, and which often works towards goals that are at variance with our
conscious pursuits.
Evolution is far from finished. When life appeared on the terrestrial scene,
what essentially emerged was the power to execute creative ideas. When mind
(or consciousness as we know it) appeared, what essentially emerged was the
power to generate such ideas.34 What has yet to emerge is the power to develop
into expressive ideas the infinite Quality/Delight at the heart of reality. When
this happens, the entire creative process—i.e., the development of Quality
into Form, using mind to generate expressive ideas and life to execute them—
will be conscious and deliberate. That power belongs to the aperspectival
consciousness of the ultimate determinant of the goings-on in the world.
If all of this sounds phantasmagoric, it is in large part because our theo-
retical dealings with the world are conditioned by the manner in which we,
at this point in history, experience the world. We conceive of the evolution of
consciousness, if not as a sudden lighting up of the bulb of sentience, then as
a progressive emergence of ways of experiencing a world that exists indepen-
dently of being experienced. There is no such world. There are only different
ways in which the One manifests itself to itself.
The different ways in which the One has hitherto manifested itself to itself
have been painstakingly documented by Jean Gebser [65,66]. One character-
istic of the several “structures of consciousness” that have emerged, or are on
the verge of emerging, is their dimensionality. An increase in the dimensional-
ity of the consciousness to which the world is manifested is tantamount to an
increase in the dimensionality of the manifested world.
Consider, by way of example, the consciousness structure that immediately
preceded the present and still dominant one. One of its characteristics was the
notion that the world is enclosed in a sphere, with the fixed stars attached to
its boundary, the firmament. We cannot but ask: what is beyond that sphere?
Those who held this notion could not, because for them the third dimension
of space—viewer-centered depth—did not at all have the reality it has for us.
Lacking our sense of this dimension, the world experienced by them was in
an important sense two-dimensional. This is why they could not handle per-
spective in drawing and painting, and why they were unable to arrive at the
subject-free “view from nowhere” [79], which is a prerequisite of modern sci-
ence. All this became possible with the consolidation, during the Renaissance,
of our characteristically three-dimensional consciousness structure.
Our very concepts of space, time, and matter are bound up with our present
consciousness structure. This made it possible to integrate the location-bound
outlook of a characteristically two-dimensional consciousness into an effec-
tively subject-free world of three-dimensional objects. Matter as we know it
34 It should be self-evident that neither life nor mind can at once set out to attend to their
respective primary tasks. The requisite anatomy and physiology must be established first,
and the more pressing tasks of self-preservation and self-replication must be attended to.
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was the result.35 It is not matter that has created consciousness; it is conscious-
ness that has created matter, first by its self-concealment, or involution, in an
apparent multitude of formless particles, and again by evolving our present
mode of experiencing the world. Ahead lies the evolution of a consciousness
structure—and thereby of a world—that transcends our time- and space-bound
perspectives. Just as the mythological thinking of the previous consciousness
structure could not foresee the technological explosion made possible by sci-
ence, so science-based thinking cannot foresee the consequences of the birth
of a new world, brought about, not by technological means, but by a further
increase in the dimensionality of consciousness.
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